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Policy Research Working Paper 5866
While Africa’s recent decade of growth and poverty 
reduction performance has been lauded, concern has 
been expressed regarding the structure of this growth. 
In particular, questions have been raised about whether 
the growth is based on a commodities boom, or whether 
it is the beginning of a structural transformation that 
will lift workers from low-productivity jobs into higher-
productivity ones. Macro evidence has suggested that 
the structural transformation has not started. But 
macro analysis misses the evidence that the process of 
transformation has started, because this process begins at 
the household level. Household livelihoods do not move 
from ones based on subsistence farming and household 
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level economic activities into livelihoods based on 
individual wage and salary employment away from the 
household in one leap—this process takes generations. 
The intermediate step is the productive informal sector. It 
is income gains at the household level in this sector that 
fuel productivity increases, savings, and investment in 
human capital in this sector. Ensuring that most households 
are able to diversify their livelihoods into the non-farm sector 
through productive informality not only increases growth, 
but also allows the majority of the population to share in the 
growth process. This paper illustrates this point with the 
case of Uganda which followed this path and experienced 
two decades of sustained growth and poverty reduction.   
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1.  Introduction 
It is widely agreed that structural transformation of the economy from a 
fundamentally agrarian, basically subsistence one to an urbanized, integrated, 
enterprise dominated one is the essence of economic development because that is 
what sustains growth and improvements in economic welfare. Over the past fifty 
years, analysis of how this transformation occurs helped to illuminate the essential 
elements of the process, and also revealed the complexity of the pathways and 
processes countries need to follow to reach this objective. This country level and cross 
country analysis has highlighted some key issues namely: path dependency in the 
transition and the salience of initial conditions, the role of the global economic 
environment and the development of neighbors and trading partners in supporting or 
hindering the transformation, and importantly, that the process is not one way, rather  
there is the possibility of reversals (World Bank, 2000). Nevertheless, the analysis has 
not disputed this fundamental pathway to sustained growth and poverty reduction. 
  Nowhere is the need for structural transformation stronger than in Sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA), where poverty is the highest. Many analysts are now bullish on 
SSA, after a decade where per capita income rose 2 percent per year on average, and 
many countries experienced substantial poverty reduction (World Bank, 2010, 2011a). 
The empirical analysis of structural transformation should facilitate our 
understanding of the state of development in SSA and how to use the tools of 
economic policy to accelerate this continent‘s structural transformation. But recent 
analyses suggest that in the case of SSA, despite a decade of strong, broad-based 
economic growth in a number of countries, the key elements of structural 
transformation are not emerging.  The manufacturing sector is growing slowly if at all, 3 
 
and most of the labor force seems mired in the swamp of low productivity agriculture, 
without exit (Headey and Dorosh, 2011).  If anything, SSA seems to be on a path of 
reversal (McMillian and Rodrick, 2011). But then a puzzle emerges.  If SSA is not 
undergoing structural transformation, how could poverty be reducing? How could the 
income levels of households be rising if nothing has been going on structurally in the 
economy for fifteen years or more?  
  In this paper, we analyze this puzzle using the case of Uganda, a country which 
has experienced both strong and sustained economic growth and poverty reduction. 
We first review the macro level evidence according to the traditional metrics of 
structural transformation, and then we look at the evidence according to some 
alternate benchmarks. Using the alternate benchmarks, we argue that Uganda (and 
other countries in SSA) is indeed undergoing a structural transformation, but of a 
more subtle nature, one more suited to their initial conditions and easily missed by 
macro indicators. We argue that it is this milestone on the transformation –productive 
informality – which ensures that poor households share in the growth and 
transformation process. While there is no question that growth in this segment of the 
economy alone will not be enough to sustain the development process, nor can this 
sector be sustained without growth and productivity improvements in other sectors, 
we suggest that unless this subtle transformation is also encouraged through 
economic policy and development strategies, inequality will widen. This in turn will 
limit growth prospects through the corrosive effect high inequality has on the 
development of institutions, and the quality of economic policy and growth. 
  The paper is organized as follows.  In section 2, we do a quick review of the 
dimensions of structural transformation.  In section 3, we review the empirics of 4 
 
structural transformation, from a microeconomic perspective. In section 4, we provide 
the basic background on Uganda‘s economic growth and poverty reduction, looking for 
the structural transformation.  In section 5, we show that according to an alternative 
way of analyzing and measuring Uganda‘s structural transformation quite a bit of 
movement has occurred, and that this type of transformation mattered for poverty 
reduction. Section 6 discusses the implications for the development strategy in 
Uganda and other low income SSA countries. We conclude in section 7 with a 
summary of key findings and policy implications.  
 
2.   Structural transformation, economic development and poverty 
reduction – A brief review 
It is no surprise that Sir Arthur Lewis, widely considered the father of 
development economics, is most famous for his exposition on how structural 
transformation works in development countries - the now famous model of the 
movement of ―surplus‖ labor out of low productivity traditional agriculture into high 
productivity modern industry (Lewis, 1954). Lewis‘ model belongs to the classical or 
institutional approach since it involved at least one market not clearing, and in the 
traditional sector, an institutionally determined rather than market determined wage. 
It was taken up by both the classical/institutional economists and the neoclassical 
economists in the 1960s and 70s, (e.g. Rostow, Chenery, etc.) and provided the basis 
for economic modeling and policy making for several decades (e.g. Chenery and Taylor, 
1968; Chenery and Syrquin, 1975; see Meier and Stiglitz, 2001, for review). 
Agriculture as an engine of the transition was rehabilitated in the 1970s and 1980s 
by, among others, Mellor (various, including 1976) and Timmer (various, including 5 
 
1988). Then in the 1990s, the ‗new economic geography‘ added the dimension of 
economic density (agglomeration) to the concept (Krugman, 1991). 
Today, it is widely agreed that economic development involves four main 
transformations (Headey and Dorosh, 2011): 
  Output transformation (decrease in the share of value added created in 
the agricultural sector, and increase in the share of value added created 
in the non-agricultural sector) 
  Employment transformation (decrease in the share of hours worked of the 
labor force in agricultural and increase in the share of hours worked of 
the labor force in non-agriculture) 
  Geographical or density transformation (increase in the share of the 
population living in it urban, high density areas, and the share of 
economic activities taking place in these areas); and 
  Demographic transformation (decrease in fertility and increase in life 
expectancy leading to decline in population growth rate and reduction in 
the dependency ratio).  
As Timmer and others have pointed out, these transitions are not all expected to take 
place at the same time. In particular, the output transformation tends to lead the 
others, and the employment transformation tends to lag (Timmer, 2008).  This is 
partly because of the simple algebra of the transition. If the agricultural sector starts 
big and the non-agricultural sector starts small, and labor is more productive in the 
non-agricultural sector because it is agglomerated and combined with more capital 
and know-how, then absorbing labor into this sector takes more investment per unit 
than in the traditional sector. So the non-agricultural sector would have to absorb 6 
 
labor more slowly than the agricultural sector in the initial stages, until the non-
agricultural sector grows to be a very large share of the economy (see Timmer, 2008 
for a numerical example). Obviously, a more rapid demographic transition, by slowing 
the growth of the labor force, would reduce the lag time, all other things being equal. 
In the modern theory and practice of economic development, one of the key 
issues in economic thought has been the relationship of structural transformation and 
poverty reduction. Initially, this question was not even considered, but then Simon 
Kuznets and others began to analyze the linkages, at first empirically and then 
theoretically (Kuznets, 1966). Kuznets and others noted that in some countries, the 
process of structural transformation was accompanied by increasing inequality. In this 
case, although a transformation was taking place which provided the basis for 
sustained growth, it was not leading to much poverty reduction because too many of 
the gains went to the upper quintiles of the income distribution. The analysis of this 
point in the literature of economic development also has a long history, and it links up 
the structure of economic growth (output transformation), the distribution of growth 
(income inequality and inclusive growth) and levels of deprivation (absolute poverty on 
multiple dimensions). Ultimately, the failure to find strong panel evidence of a Kuznets 
relationship (especially the downward sloping part of the curve) led economists to 
move away from viewing an increase in poverty or inequality as in some way a 
mechanical or automatic consequence of broad-based growth or structural 
transformation. On the contrary, broad-based, growth and structural transformation 
came to be seen as necessary for poverty reduction and vice versa (World Bank 1990, 
2001, 2005).  7 
 
But then along came the new economic geography, which provided both a 
strong theoretical argument for a relationship between structural transformation and 
rural-urban inequality (economies of scale and agglomeration, see World Bank, 2009 
for a discussion as applied to low income countries).  While analysis of ―Asian tiger‖ 
economies showed that absolute poverty can decrease along with structural 
transformation, the rising inequality which usually accompanies agglomeration and 
urbanization makes the problem more complex (World Bank, 2009). Measures need to 
be taken to manage this transition in lagging areas to avoid an unequal growth which 
excludes large swaths of the population.  
At the same time that the new economic geography brought a theoretical and 
empirical justification to the questions of growth and transformation, and inequality 
and poverty reduction, another set of analysis showed that too much inequality is 
actually toxic for growth and structural transformation (World Bank, 2005). While no 
absolute level has been identified as a maximum, experience from a number of 
countries indicates that growth problems occur at the high end of the usual income 
distribution measures. Explanations for this type of growth slowdown include the 
political difficulty of implementing economic policies which would create broad-based 
growth when so much of the wealth is held by a small group, and the effect of 
inequality traps on savings, investment and market institutions.4 Timmer, in a recent 
paper, argues that a process of structural transformation which results in big 
productivity gaps between the agricultural sector and the non-agricultural sector will 
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create a political situation which results in protectionist policies which slow growth 
and poverty reduction.5  
While Timmer‘s discussion focuses on measures to increase agricultural 
productivity as a way to reduce inequality, a complementary path to reach Timmer‘s 
goal of higher rural incomes would be to focus on the rural non-farm economy (RNFE), 
a subset of the informal sector. The role of the RNFE in supporting development and 
structural change was recognized as far back as the 1970s (see Anderson and 
Leiserson, 1978, cited in Haggblade et al, 2010). The work of Haggblade and others 
have recently highlighted the important role this sector has played in growth, 
structural change, and sometimes poverty reduction, although the evidence is mixed 
because of the heterogeneity of the sector and the policy environment in developing 
countries.  
This new thinking and empirical work has not altered the fundamental 
proposition that structural change is the basis for sustained long term growth and 
poverty reduction. But it does suggest that the type of structural change matters. And 
the sustained growth in some SSA countries with limited structural change becomes a 
paradox, as does the poverty reduction performance – unless the traditional analysis 
misses aspects of structural transformation in SSA at the micro level, such as the 
development of rural and urban informal NFE. The next two sections offer insights on 
how traditional analysis tends to miss the structural transformation in the region (a) 
by using macro levels measures which fail to measure the growth of informal NFE, and 
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recent structural change has resulted in a huge widening of the productivity difference between 
the agriculture and non-agricultural sectors (McMillian and Rodrick, 2011), and India has a 
well protection agricultural sector.  9 
 
(b) by dismissing lower productivity informal NFE instead of recognizing that they are 
a key transitional mechanism along the way.  
3.   Is Africa experiencing structural transformation along with growth 
and poverty reduction? Measurement issues 
There is not much doubt that a number of countries in low income SSA 
experienced a sustained period of economic growth between 1998 and 2008 which was 
not confined primarily to one dominant sector, and that growth was accompanied by 
substantial poverty reduction 6(World Bank, 2010, 2011a). During the same period, 
the share of agriculture in value added continued to fall in many of the countries from 
the pre-independence period high; it now averages around 20-25 percent. However, 
the share of value added in manufacturing in many of these countries either did not 
grow or grew very slowly over the same period, leading some to question whether 
structural transformation in output was taking place (Headey and Dorosh, 2011). 
Similar numbers for the same period on the employment transition are mostly not 
available. The share of the population living in urban areas is increasing rapidly, but 
in most countries the annual growth rate of the population still exceeds 2.5% per 
annum, owing primarily to high fertility (World Bank, 2010). The question we consider 
in this section is whether it is possible to reach a conclusion on whether structural 
transformation is taking place.  
The measurement of the four transformations is usually considered fairly 
straightforward in the empirical literature. Output transition is measured by the 
                                                           
6 World Bank ,2011 cites 22 countries with a ten-year growth record of 4% per annum or more 
(meaning 10 years of per capita economic growth at 1% of more), and these countries made up 
about 40% of Africa‘s population. Another 30% of the population lives in countries which also 
experienced strong growth, but this growth was dominated by mineral exports. The rest lived in 
countries with broad-based, but lower growth.  10 
 
national accounts; employment through labor force statistics on the primary sector of 
activity of those employed; agglomeration through population or firm censuses; and 
demographic through demographic surveys (or population censuses). Each of these 
suffers from its own measurement problems, but those associated with the first two 
are most severe in SSA. This is primarily because of the absence of well-structured 
and monetized goods and labor markets, and also because of weak statistical capacity 
in low income countries. In the case of the measurement of output by sector, it is well 
known that national accounts data underestimate production (especially agriculture) 
for home use, and the value added of unincorporated microenterprises and self-
employment (often called the ―informal sector‖ or ―informal enterprise activity‖). These 
omissions can be substantial. For example, attempts to more accurately account for 
this type of production in Ghana resulted in a 60 percent increase in GDP for 2006 
and subsequent years.7 They will also bias estimates of agricultural production 
downward.  
The measurement of employment by sector is even more difficult, owing to the 
fact that most employment in low income SSA takes place through economic activities 
done outside of a firm (and a labor market), does not take place in the same location 
every day, and likewise may not occupy a set schedule and may not even involve the 
same output sector every day or week or hour. For example, at one point in time a 
member of the household might be involved in running the household RNFE, or selling 
labor on a casual basis in the construction sector, and at another point harvesting the 
household crops for sale or consumption. This reality means that the conceptual 
variable used to measure the employment transformation - ―sector of employment‖ - is 
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more a matter of degree at the individual level than the absolute sector choice 
indicated by the above definition.  
Adding to the confusion is that SSA countries tend to use conventional labor 
force surveys, designed for and well suited to the structured and monetized labor 
markets of OECD countries. When applied in SSA, these questionnaires can result in 
both outright omission of large segments of the working age population from the labor 
force, and underestimation of the extent of economic activity by individuals in a given 
sector. It can also result in the misclassification of the (primary) sector of economic 
activity because the sector where someone spends the most hours may not be the 
sector where the person creates the most value.   
  We quantified the extent of this measurement problem in Uganda using the 
2005/6 UNHS household survey data, and we found it to be severe (Fox, 2009). First, 
we checked the importance of seasonality.  Using the most commonly used recall 
period to measure of employment status – did you work in the last 7 days – resulted in 
a 10 percent smaller labor force than using a more appropriate recall period of 12 
months. We found that the sector reported for the primary activity varied by whether 
the recall period was 7 days or 12 months. We also found that the use of screening 
questions in the 2005/6 survey dramatically increased the number of females and 
youth who reported that they were active in the labor force, compared with previous 
years. Finally, we found that 40% of the labor force had both a primary and a 
secondary economic activity, and these activities were in different sectors, suggesting 
that the classification of the employed labor force by primary economic activity would 
not pick up a major portion of the economic activity going on in Uganda. All of the 12 
 
above suggests that the measurement of the employment transition will be 
problematic in SSA for some time. 
One of the most dominant features of employment in low income SSA countries 
is actually the lack of labor markets – the fact that some 80-90 percent of the labor 
force do not work under contract (formal, informal, casual or piecework) for someone 
outside of their family.  Instead, they work in an economic activity which is owned and 
operated by themselves or their household members – either a farm or firm or both. 
Often called the ―informal sector‖ or the ―informal economy‖, it is this mode of 
employment – where tasks are assigned through a household decision making 
process, and remuneration (or control over available consumption resources) occurs in 
cash or in kind, again through some sort of communal arrangement - which 
dominates the employment structure. While Lewis, and most development economist 
who followed him, labeled these activities as the ―traditional‖ sector – and thus 
primarily agriculture based, this is an oversimplification. The activities do not always 
take place in the agricultural sector or even in rural areas. The level of technology, 
capital, and productivity can vary widely. It is this phenomenon which most 
complicates the measurement and analysis of structural transformation. As we will 
see in the case of Uganda, using traditional measures, the complexity and 
heterogeneity of this sector is easily missed, as is its role in facilitating the 
transformation and reducing inequality. 
4.   Uganda’s growth and poverty record 
Since the early 1990s, Uganda has had a strong record of economic growth and 
poverty reduction. Output (GDP) has grown at an average annual rate of 8 percent per 
annum since 1992, so that even with a population growth rate over 3%, there has 13 
 
been solid growth in per capita income. And the growth by sector has followed the 
expected path of transformation.  Growth in value added in agriculture has been slow, 
while annual growth in industry and services has been double digit. The share of 
industry in GDP has more than doubled, and is now a respectable 26% while services, 
including government, account for 50% of GDP (see Figure 1). Within industry, most of 
the growth did not come from the very capital intensive mining sector, but actually 
resulted from import-substitution manufacturing and the development of non-
traditional exports (World Bank, 2007). 
 
Figure 1: Trends in sectoral share of GDP in Uganda, 1992-2009 
 
Source: World Development Indicators, 2010 and Povcal Net, 2011 
 
Not surprisingly, this growth resulted in substantial poverty reduction. The 
poverty head count, measured at the international poverty line of $1.25/day, fell from 
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declined, as did the severity of poverty, as measured by the poverty gap and squared 
poverty gap. 
  Even after making adjustments for the inconsistency of Ugandan labor force 
data over time, we still find an overwhelming majority of the workforce reporting 
agriculture as their primary economic activity in the most recent household survey 
(see Table 1).8 Indeed, it appears that the Uganda‘s high rate of non-agricultural 
economic growth allowed only a very small part of the labor force to move into higher 
value activities. Are these numbers a true reflection of the employment transition? 
First, Uganda has added 7 million people (i.e. doubled) into the labor force since 1992, 
and at least 2.7 million (i.e. 40%) of these eventually found primary employment 
outside the agricultural sector. So the slow demographic transition hides some of the 
structural shifts. Second, since the first data were collected in 1992 the Ugandan 
basic multipurpose household survey instrument (UNHS) has been modified, with the 
improvements designed in part to sweep more people into the labor force. Many of 
those left out in 1992 worked primarily in agriculture. But the result of the changes 
makes it impossible to get a consistent series on employment in Uganda. Our 
estimates attempt to correct for this, but still show a less than expected net flow out of 
agriculture as a primary source of employment given the extent of the economic 
transformation suggested by the sectoral GDP numbers, and the high rate of poverty 
                                                           
8 The labor module used in Uganda‘s National Household Surveys (UNHS) has been changing 
since 1992 leading to problems of comparability across surveys. Major changes include the 
introduction of screening for economic participation in 2002/03 (with short screening) and 
2005/06 (with detailed screening) and varying recall periods for main and secondary 
employment statuses. The level of details on employment statuses also change, with the latest 
survey (UNHS 2009/10) missing secondary employment in the 12 months recall and thus 
limiting the usefulness of that data for livelihood analysis. Consequently this paper uses the 
UNHS 2005/06 as the latest survey whenever secondary employment or a complete livelihood 
analysis is required.  Measurement of employment status and economic participation is done 
only with surveys cases where these variables can be constructed in a comparable way e.g. by 
building from main employment status questions and household enterprise modules using 
similar recall periods. 15 
 
reduction. In particular, if the UNHS data are correct, very little has changed in the 
last decade.9 
Table 1:  Sectoral composition of primary employment, 1992/93 - 2009/10 show 
sluggish movement out of agriculture 
  Year 
  1992/93  2002/03  2005/06  2009/10 
Labor force  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
  Agriculture  82.6  70.2  74.9  70.0 
  Industry  4.5  7.2  5.4  8.0 
  Services  12.9  22.6  19.7  22.0 
Source: Authors calculations based on the IHS 1992/93, UNHS 2002/03, UNHS 
2005/06 and UNHS 2009/10  
 
5.  Uganda’s structural transformation and its impact on poverty 
5.1  Nature of the transformation 
If the movement of labor from the low productivity sector (agriculture) to the 
higher productivity sectors was limited, then what were the drivers of the extensive 
poverty reduction?  Our analysis suggests three channels: 
(i) transformation in the type of employment in each sector;  
(ii) transformation in household livelihood portfolios; and 
(iii) transformation within the agricultural sector, from ―traditional subsistence‖ 
to new, higher value export crops, the use of livestock, and modern marketing 
channels.  
 
  To see the first transformation, the change in the structure of primary 
employment by sector is broken down by type of employment within the sector (see 
Figure 2). While the reported primary sector of employment of those in the labor force 
                                                           
9 We found significant inconsistencies in the 2009/10 employment data, and suspect that the 
2009/10 questionnaire undercounted non-wage employment, especially secondary 
employment. We made some adjustments to correct for this, ad are reasonably confident about 
the data on primary employment by sector shown here.   16 
 
may not have changed very much, the type of employment within sectors did. Wage 
employment of any type grew much faster than the labor force over the 15 year period 
and private-non agriculture wage employment increased by around 12 percent per 
annum between 2002/03 and 2005/06. This recent increase was one of the fastest 
growth rates in private wage jobs in Africa, second only to Ghana (World Bank, 2010).  
 
Figure 2: Non-wage employment accounted for most of the employment growth 
 
Source: Authors calculations based on the IHS 1992/93 and UNHS 2005/06 
 
  Non-wage employment outside the agricultural sector (self-employment, micro-
enterprise owner, or family helper) grew even faster, dwarfing the increase in wage 
employment. Employment in a non-farm household enterprise accounted for the 
majority net primary non-agriculture jobs created between 1992/93 and 2005/06, 
absorbing many of those who came into the labor force without a primary education 
certificate and thus lack qualifications needed for most types of wage employment. The 
traditional employment, family farming, grew the slowest at a rate below the growth of 
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would be expected from the GDP numbers, because non-wage jobs tend to be much 
lower productivity.10 
Figure 3: Incomes sources of households in Uganda, 1992/93-2005/06, showing that 
share of non-agricultural income sources grew, 
   
Source: Authors‘ calculations based on the IHS 1992/93 and UNHS 2005/06  
  Moving to household livelihoods (which covers all employment, not just primary 
employment) we see a clear trend toward income diversification into incomes sources 
outside-subsistence agriculture as expected. A comparison of household sources of 
income in 1992/93 and 2005/06 in Figure 3 shows that the proportion of households 
with an income from non-farm sources increased dramatically.  The proportion of 
households with a private non-agricultural income almost doubled while that of 
households with non-farm household enterprise increased by 50 percent. The number 
of NFEs has been rising at an annual average rate of 6 percent in the past decade. A  
                                                           
10 We do not have the data to estimate the productivity of wage and non-age jobs by sector. 
Most analyses find that informal enterprises have lower labor productivity.  To the extent that 
earnings reflect productivity, Uganda is no exception; median earnings are lower in non-wage 
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driving factor is that in rural areas, many households had reached their limits to 
growth in agricultural incomes owing to productive land shortages, as 58% of 
Ugandan farms were less than one acre in 2005/6 (World Bank, 2011b). By 2009/10, 
about 40 percent of rural households operated a non-farm household enterprise (HE) 
compared to 24 percent in 1992/93. 
Figure 4: Comparison of rural household livelihood portfolios in Uganda, 1992/93 -
2005/06, shows major increase in sources of income  
   
  Source: Authors‘ calculations based on the IHS 1992/93 and UNHS 2005/06  
This diversification was an addition to household livelihoods, not a switch, 
which is why it does not show up in the primary employment data. Figure 4 shows 
how households combine types of incomes into livelihoods. As a result of the growth in 
other sources on income, the proportion of households that solely rely only on farm 
income (both wage and non-wage) declined by a third, from 54 percent in 1992/93 to 
36 percent in 2005/06. In rural areas, the proportion of households relying on 
agriculture income only (usually subsistence) declined by 43 percent during this 
Ag wage 
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period (see Figure 4). Thus while agriculture remains a source of income for 77 
percent of households in Uganda and 87 percent of rural households, by 2005/6 the 
overwhelming majority of households were complementing it with income from other 
activities which are usually more productive – meaning that they added activities over 
the period, rather than switching sectors entirely. In urban areas, the expansion of 
wage employment was an important driver of income diversification, but in rural areas 
it clearly was NFE. 
The shift appears more dramatic in the household level analysis because most 
households still rate their enterprises as a secondary activity, (especially in rural 
areas). So the high growth in non-farm enterprises is not reflected as dramatically in 
the employment data above, which shows only primary employment. This leads to the 
perception of the stagnation in the structure of the labor force when structural change 
is measured in the traditional way, e.g. using primary employment data. Note that as 
we have four types of activities, we actually have combinations, even though we only 
show the top nine in the figure. The expansion in the ‗other category refers to these 
omitted combination, including the households with four types of income. 
  Uganda‘s third structural transformation was within the agricultural sector.11 
Since 1992, Ugandan farmers have gained productivity, diversified their crops, and 
become more commercialized. In 2005/6, household survey data suggests that most 
Ugandan framers produce four or more crops during the year, including several for the 
market. Among the top 25% farmers, the average sale to production ratio was 50%. By 
2005/6 many farmers depended on either crop sales or non-farm income for their 
staple foods instead of their own production – roughly 40 percent of all farming 
                                                           
11 See World Bank, 2011b for further discussion of the evolution of Uganda‘s agricultural 
sector. 20 
 
household get a large share of their staple foods from the market. In 1992, coffee was 
king among Ugandan commercial crops and exports – by value, it accounted for about 
90% of exports. By 2008, even with high prices of that season, Ugandan coffee 
accounted for about less than one-third of Ugandan merchandise exports by value. 
On-farm production of livestock and related products has been growing as well – milk, 
eggs, chickens, pigs, etc. for both domestic and regional consumption.  While use of 
modern seeds remains low, suggesting that Uganda has a way to go in transforming 
agriculture, this important within-sector transformation is on its way.  
Rather than happening independently, our analysis indicates that the trends 
are related. The diversification increased household incomes, and contributed to the 
structural transformation within the agricultural sector by providing extra liquidity, 
thus compensating for the failure of rural credit markets.  Evidence from the UNHS 
2005/06 shows that agricultural households with other sources of income report 
higher income from agriculture on average. They are also more likely to buy other 
fertilizers, seeds and other marketed inputs. This implies that instead of substituting 
agricultural income, households with a diversified livelihood portfolio use their various 
income sources to compliment farm incomes by providing working capital for their 
farms. This raises yields on their farms thus increasing their incomes further. This is 
not a surprising result, as other studies have found similar relationships between NFE 
and modernization of farming practices in Asia (Haggblade et al, 2010). Likewise, 
qualitative evidence shows that increases in farm cash incomes support the growth of 
the non-farm enterprise sector by increasing demand for these products (Bakeine, 
2010).  21 
 
5.2  Evidence on the role of livelihood transformation and poverty 
reduction 
  Without panel data, analysis of the role of Uganda‘s livelihood transformations 
in poverty reduction suffers from inherent problems of endogeniety. Nonetheless, the 
evidence strongly suggests a relationship.  Despite the enormous problems of 
comparing earnings in wage and non-wage sectors, all evidence points to the non-farm 
sector offering higher earnings than subsistence farming – not only because hours 
worked over the year tend to be higher but also real earnings per day are on average 
higher. The diversification of household livelihood portfolios into non-farm sources of 
income thus increases income and household welfare. 
  To quantify the role of household livelihood expansion in poverty reduction, we 
estimate determinants of household welfare. We run the standard OLS regression, but 
we include type of income source and their interactions as explanatory variables and 
controlling for other confounders. Household welfare is proxied by the natural log of 
monthly consumption per adult equivalent. This analysis is based on the UNHS 
2005/06, which was chosen ahead of the UNHS 2009/10 due to previously mentioned 
data problems in the labor module that renders the later survey inadequate for a 
complete livelihood analysis. The results from the consumption regressions are 
presented in Table 2 and summary statistics of the explanatory variables used in the 
regression are presented in Table 3 in the appendix. 
Regression results show that households with income from a household 
enterprise have a higher income by at least 14 percent in rural areas and 23 percent in 
urban areas, while those with non-agriculture wage income have higher per capita 
welfare by at least 12 percent in rural areas and 13 percent in urban areas (columns 22 
 
1(a) and 2(a)). The specification controls for age and level of education so we can see 
the important role of the ability of at least one member of the household to access 
nonfarm income in raising household consumption. 
Columns 1(b) and 2(b) use the livelihood combinations we identified above, and 
this specification also shows that households with a non-farm enterprise or wage 
income have higher levels of welfare than households with family farm income only. 
Compared to similar households with only farm income, those earning an income from 
household enterprises only have a higher welfare by nearly 27 percent and 40 percent 
in rural and urban areas respectively, while those with a nonfarm wage income only 
respectively have a higher by 36 percent and 32 percent. Households in rural areas 
with both family farm and non-farm income do better as well, and the coefficients on 
the combinations are about as high as in column 1(a). But in urban areas, the 
combinations which include enterprise income clearly stand out as the best relative to 
only farm income, even controlling for education. Thus the increase of the proportion 
of households with income from nonfarm enterprises or wage jobs since 1992 appears 





 Table 2: Regression Results: Determinants of the log of consumption per adult equivalent in 
Uganda, 2005/6a 
 
Rural Areas  Urban Areas 
 
1(a)  1(b)  2(a)  2(b) 
Variable Description  Coeff  S.E  Coeff  S.E  Coeff  S.E  Coeff  S.E 
Household demographic 
characteristics 
                Household size  -0.113***  0.009  -0.113***  0.009  -0.169***  0.016  -0.169***  0.017 
Household size squared  0.004***  0.001  0.004***  0.001  0.007***  0.001  0.007***  0.001 
Male headed household  0.019  0.018  0.023  0.018  0.014  0.036  0.018  0.037 
Age of household head  0.007**  0.003  0.008**  0.003  0.031***  0.006  0.030***  0.006 
Age of household head squared  -0.0001**  0.000  -0.0001**  0.000  -0.000***  0.0001  -0.0001***  0.000 
Household education characteristicsb 
                Prop. 15+ with some primary education  0.132***  0.025  0.130***  0.025  0.243***  0.068  0.261***  0.07 
Prop. 15+ with complete. primary 
education  0.387***  0.031  0.384***  0.031  0.542***  0.072  0.567***  0.073 
Prop. 15+ with some secondary 
education  0.557***  0.039  0.559***  0.039  0.697***  0.074  0.734***  0.075 
Prop. 15+ with complete. secondary or 
degree  1.088***  0.075  1.089***  0.074  1.378***  0.089  1.421***  0.088 
Household sources of income 
                Has farm non-wage income  -0.091***  0.027 
   
-0.05  0.037 
    Has non-farm enterprise income  0.134***  0.015 
   
0.209***  0.034 
    Has agric wage income  -0.124***  0.017 
   
-0.212***  0.059 
    Has non-farm wage income  0.113***  0.02 
   
0.123***  0.036 
    Receives remittances  0.041**  0.016  0.036**  0.016  0.047  0.033  0.045  0.033 
Livelihood category (Base category – Farm non-wage) 
    Has nonfarm wage income only 
   
0.308***  0.059 
   
0.277***  0.076 
Has farm wage income only 
   
-0.072  0.054 
   
0.088  0.147 
Has household enterprise income only 
   
0.236***  0.048 
   
0.334***  0.073 
Has farm non wage & farm wage income 
only 
   
-0.117***  0.023 
   
0.073  0.135 
Has farm non wage & household 
enterprise income only 
   
0.119***  0.02 
   
0.372***  0.081 
Has farm non wage & non-farm wage 
income only 
   
0.054*  0.029 
   
0.170**  0.082 
Has farm non wage, non-farm wage & 
household enterprise income only 
   
0.276***  0.04 
   
0.468***  0.083 
Has non-farm wage & household 
enterprise income only 
   
0.322***  0.069 
   
0.448***  0.081 
Other livelihood category 
   
0.014  0.024 
   
0.228**  0.082 
Household location 
                Resides in an Internally Displaces 
People's Camp  -0.225***  0.033  -0.216***  0.032  -0.217*  0.113  -0.231*  0.132 
Constant  10.516***  0.068  10.410***  0.068  10.202***  0.145  10.052***  0.161 
Observations  5536  5574  1575  1602 
Adjusted R -Squared  0.355  0.355  0.437  0.430 
Notes: (a) ;  * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.001, S.E – robust standard errors. Results based on unweighted regressions and 
includes regional fixed effects (not shown).(b) Education variables are based on the proportion of household members 
aged 15 and above who are not currently in school.  24 
 
The relationship between sector and type of economic activity among household 
members, and household welfare in Uganda has been found in other analyses as well. 
Consumption regressions based on data from previous UNHS also show that type of 
employment is a significant independent predictor of household welfare, with 
employment in non-farm sectors having a greater effect on welfare (World Bank, 2006). 
Although correlations between the growth of non-farm income opportunities and lower 
poverty, either over time in Uganda or at the household level in repeated cross 
sections do not necessarily imply causality, they do suggest that the expansion of the 
non-farm enterprises in the informal sector was indeed good structural transformation 
for Uganda as it seeks to alleviate poverty. 
 
6.  Discussion 
  Despite the importance of non-farm household enterprise incomes in increasing 
household welfare, it has to be recognized that most economic activities in non-farm 
enterprises use low capital and rudimentary technology. They are usually services, or 
the production of low quality goods. Therefore, labor productivity growth in this sector 
has limits and the risk of failure is also high. Although some hire external labor, many 
depend only on family labor input. Nearly 80 percent did not have a hired worker in 
2005/06 while only 6 percent had three or more workers. When HEs are started as a 
secondary source of income, employment was not always full time. Around 44 percent 
of HEs (in operation for at least one year) reported operating for less than 12 months 
in a year, with 21 percent operating for less than six months in 2005/06 for example. 
In rural areas, it is common for households with non-farm enterprises to devote some 
weeks entirely to agriculture. About half of household enterprises seem to fail within 25 
 
three years of operation owing to risks and various challenges faced by the informal 
sector.  
  So how can increasing the volume of informal activity, which lowers overall 
productivity in the non-agricultural sectors, be good for development and poverty 
reduction? Squaring these two can be difficult. It seems that this type of structural 
transformation can give off contradictory signals. This type of non-agricultural labor 
productivity-lowering transformation is important for poverty reduction because even 
while lowering average labor productivity in the non-agricultural sectors, the gap 
between marginal labor productivity in these sectors versus agriculture remains high 
so those who move into the non-farm sectors gain.  
  This brings up three issues, however.  First, Uganda did grow pretty rapidly. It 
is hard to do better than 8 percent per annum for 18 years. A strategy which included 
informal enterprises delivered strong growth because it was broad based, and included 
growth and innovation in the agricultural sector, modest growth in industry and 
growth in the informal enterprise sector. We don‘t know how much growth came from 
informal enterprises as the national accounts are not disaggregated in this way, but 
the sector clearly contributed, otherwise incomes would not have grown.  Second, 
similar to other countries in Africa, Uganda is experiencing very high labor supply 
growth (nearly 3 per cent per year) owing to past high fertility. An average of one 
hundred thousand non-agriculture wage jobs were created per year between 2002/03 
and 2005/06, but an average of four hundred thousand people entered the labor 
market each year – outnumbering the net private wage jobs created by a factor of four. 
Absorbing these in non-agriculture wage jobs would have required more than doubling 
non-agriculture wage jobs in three years (i.e. requiring an astronomical non-
agriculture wage employment growth rate of 31 per annum). And still the majority of 26 
 
the labor force (i.e. those already in the labor force) would have been outside the wage 
and salary sector. Thus given Uganda‘s population dynamics, a structural 
transformation to a labor market dominated by private wage employment will take 
several decades at least. Many labor market entrants will continue to be absorbed in 
self-employment in agriculture and household enterprise in the medium to long term 
even with continued high growth in non-agriculture wage employment. 
  But as important, a strategy focused only on creating “formal sector jobs” and 
destroying or discouraging informal sector non-farm jobs, would have resulted in less 
inclusive, less poverty reducing growth. In simple arithmetic, keeping average 
productivity in the non-agricultural sectors high would mean that the same growth 
would create fewer income earning opportunities in the non-agricultural sectors. This 
would force the vast majority of the labor force to stay in agriculture as their only 
sector of employment – resulting in lower incomes and more poverty. Of course, 
growth processes are more complicated than simple arithmetic, but illustrates the 
point. If SSA growth and private sector development strategies only focus on 
encouraging larger better organized enterprises that create wage and salary jobs, and 
do not also focus on transition mechanisms out of agriculture for the rest of the labor 
force, especially the labor force in smaller cities and towns, the result will be slower 
growth, widening income inequality and slower poverty reduction. 12 Slower growth 
will arise not only because the productivity of the majority of household livelihoods will 
rise more slowly, but also because widening income inequality itself can be expected to 
have growth-lowering effects, based on the experience of other countries.   
                                                           
12 Timmer, (2008) makes this point about average productivity and income inequality with a 
more sophisticated example generated from a simple CGE model. He argues that the strength 
of the East Asian miracle in poverty reduction was that the ratio of labor productivity in non-
agriculture vs. agriculture was kept low, in part because of investments in agricultural 
productivity. But the growth of the NFE sector also was important.  27 
 
Would growth and poverty reduction have been higher if more high productivity 
jobs in the non-agricultural sector had been created, through the creation of even more 
large firms? Of course, and this is an argument of McMillan and Rodrick (2011), when 
they document the declining productivity in non-agricultural sectors in low income 
SSA. But we argue that a decline in average labor productivity in the non-farm sectors 
was inevitable at the start of the transformation unless the growth in large enterprises 
is at the expense of growth in small, low productivity informal enterprises. The type of 
growth in manufacturing jobs which occurred in the 1960s and 1970s in many SSA 
countries was indeed at the expense of other sectors, as it depressed agriculture. In 
the end, it was not sustainable. What SSA needs is growth strategies which create new 
private sector wage and salary jobs, and grow agricultural productivity, and create and 
strengthen new NFEs. That is the growth Uganda achieved. 
  The sector unfortunately continues to receive inadequate support in SSA 
countries owing to misconceptions and myths about its legality, and contribution to 
government revenue generation and local economic development. Yet as the analysis 
above showed, the expansion of this sector contributed to poverty reduction in 
Uganda. Furthermore, other studies in Uganda also show that household enterprises 
in the informal sector pay for license, user fees and/or permit fees to the local 
government, contributing close to two thirds of local governments‘ locally generated 
revenues (Bakiene, 2010). The perception that household enterprises in the informal 
sector do not contribute to local government revenues is therefore not supported by 
evidence. Instead, HEs play an important role in local economic development (yet more 
evidence on their contribution to growth).  
  Supporting the enterprise growth implies a different type of development 
strategy – one that focuses not on wiping out the informal sector but rather on raising 28 
 
the productivity of these activities. This requires a focuses on local economic 
development and the local economic environment for these businesses, including 
access to good locations for workplaces for small scale manufacturing and for markets 
and pedestrian zones for retail sales, including hawkers, and on household access to 
financial services – for savings and credit. It also means supporting associations and 
linkages. Traditional development approaches – which have ignored the informal 
sector - assume that household enterprises have no direct linkages to defined markets 
and other value chain actors, and that linkages through sub-contracting 
arrangements are cannot be created in the household enterprise landscape.  This 
negative approach contributes to the perpetuation of irregular and erratic financial 
inflows.  
  New research shows the potential role of HEs in value chains if producer 
associations can be created and markets are structured to include them. Recent 
analysis by the Monitor Group (Monitor, 2011) has highlighted how imaginative new 
―Bottom of the Pyramid‖ business models in low income SSA have been able to forge 
these linkages with HEs so that more established companies can profit from using 
informal sector petty including trading activities in their distribution chains. These 
companies are using simple distribution or aggregation methods to gain from the wide 
market outlet channels that petty trading provides to their products or services. These 
new strategies actually build on models established by multinational companies such 
as the mobile phone companies or Coca Cola distributors. A recent study showed that 
the proliferation of trading in mobile phone credits by hawkers for MTN, Vodafone and 
other telecommunication giants in Ghana is providing above-average income to these 
HEs while benefitting the companies (Kottoh, 2008). This microeconomic research 
supports the proposition that this type of economic development in SSA can be 29 
 
developed through appropriate policy responses which recognize the importance of the 
sector for growth and poverty reduction.   
 
7.  Conclusions 
  The theory and empirics of structural transformation as a development concept 
have thus far mostly focused on the growth of firms, especially medium sized and 
above ―formal sector firms‖. This is not unexpected. As a number of economic 
historians have pointed out, the firm is one of the most efficient economic institutions 
in the world, and aside from mineral-dominated economies such as Saudi Arabia, the 
path to sustainable middle income status in the last 100 years, especially for small 
countries, has involved the growth of large, efficient, export-oriented firms. Normally 
these firms aggregate in large cities to increase economic density.  
  Perhaps because of their lower population density – which limits the economies 
of aggregation - as well as their initial low levels of education and know-how – which 
has constrained the level of technology in the economy and therefore the 
competitiveness of the manufacturing sector compared with the East Asian tigers - the 
development of SSA countries who have achieved sustained high levels of broad-based 
growth and poverty reduction has followed a different path so far. In countries such as 
Uganda, without a major mineral export to create income growth, structural 
transformation has involved significant growth of value added and employment in 
formal firms, but from a low base so this still accounts for a small share of total 
employment. At the same time, Uganda has seen a massive growth of informal firms, 
especially household enterprises. While most development economists, especially 
those who focus on the development of the modern private sector, consider the growth 30 
 
of these ―informal‖ firms to be a symptom of a lack of transformation, we have argued 
here that they are actually an important milestone on the transformation path and a 
critical part of the transformation, which needs to be supported. 
  The development of the household enterprise sector is also a milestone which is 
often misunderstood. Because average and marginal productivity of labor and capital 
are much lower in household enterprises than in large firms (in either manufacturing 
or services), the growth of the household enterprise sector can be seen as a drag on 
average productivity in the non-agricultural sectors. But this view ignores the fact that 
the same trend will be raising average and marginal productivity in the economy as a 
whole. And since the labor in the household enterprise sector is usually not educated 
enough for the wage employment opportunities in the formal sector, the only way to 
raise the productivity and income of this segment of the labor supply once they have 
exited the education system and entered the world of work is to support changes in 
household livelihood patterns toward the non-agricultural sector.  This means 
supporting the growth in income and productivity of the household enterprise sector - 
along with the growth of smallholder agriculture. While the concept of the rural non-
farm sector as a key element of growth, transformation and poverty reduction is not a 
new idea in economic development, the practice in SSAA has been particularly weak, 
owing to the focus on classical industrial transformation trajectories.  
  In addition to emphasizing the role of livelihood (as opposed to employment) 
transformation in overall structural transformation, the paper draws two other 
conclusions from these findings. First is that the expansion of the non-farm informal 
sector is positive development rather than a scourge. The phenomenal growth of farm 
household enterprises in the informal sector drove household livelihood 
transformation and ownership of a non-farm enterprise is a significant predictor of 31 
 
welfare. Second is that any analysis that uses primary employment at the individual 
level, looking for Lewisian transformation, misses livelihood transformations. This 
transformation of the traditional household sector is rather subtle and will not be 
immediately mirrored in large changes in the structure of primary economic activities 
for the labor force.  Household‘s livelihoods in Uganda are best understood by looking 
beyond the main employment activities and taking the approach that household 
incomes come from a portfolio of several economic activities. Tracking the role of the 
HE sector in transforming the economy and in poverty reduction requires collecting 
and analyzing economic and employment data through the livelihood lens, not the lens 
of a labor market where one person sells labor and another buys the labor services. 
This is a different approach than orthodox labor economics. It requires analyzing the 
production decisions of households over the year, as social and economic units, and 
how these are transformed in response to opportunities and challenges presented.  
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Table 3: Means of explanatory variables used in the regressions 
Variable  Rural  Urban  All 
Household demographic characteristics          
Household size  5.32  4.57  5.19 
Household size squared  36.90  29.11  35.54 
Male headed household  0.74  0.71  0.73 
Age of household head  43.02  37.97  42.14 







Household education characteristics 
      Prop. 15+ with no formal education   0.24  0.09  0.21 
Prop. 15+ with some primary education   0.45  0.29  0.43 
Prop. 15+ with complete. primary education   0.19  0.25  0.20 
Prop. 15+ with some secondary education   0.09  0.22  0.11 
Prop. 15+ with complete. secondary or degree   0.03  0.13  0.05 
Household sources of income 
      Has farm non-wage income  0.87  0.30  0.77 
Has non-farm enterprise income  0.39  0.55  0.41 
Has agric wage income  0.24  0.05  0.21 
Has non-farm wage income  0.20  0.57  0.26 
Receives remittances  0.44  0.43  0.44 
Livelihood category  
      Has farm non wage income only  0.28  0.04  0.24 
Has nonfarm wage income only  0.04  0.27  0.08 
Has farm wage income only  0.05  0.01  0.04 
Has household enterprise income only  0.05  0.24  0.09 
Has farm non wage & farm wage income only  0.10  0.01  0.08 
Has farm non wage & household enterprise 
income only  0.20  0.06  0.17 
Has farm non wage & non-farm wage income 
only  0.07  0.04  0.07 
Has farm non wage, non-farm wage & 
household enterprise income only  0.04  0.06  0.04 
Has non-farm wage & household enterprise 
income only  0.02  0.16  0.04 
Other livelihood category  0.15  0.11  0.15 
Household location 
      Resides in an Internally Displaces People's 
Camp  0.07  0.01  0.06 
Central region  26.09  59.23  31.87 
Eastern region  25.42  12.91  23.24 
Northern region  20.81  14.68  19.74 
Western region  27.68  13.17  25.15 
 
 